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  1. Home
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Browsing by Author "Mendoza, Maria Veronica R."

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    Electoral cycles and procurement allocation: evidence from Philippine government contracts (2021–2025)
    (2026-06-10) Mendoza, Maria Veronica R.; Sumajit, Mary Khristine Gwynette S.; Balaoing-Pelkmans, Edylinda Anette O.
    This paper empirically explores variations in government procurement implementation in the Philippines across electoral cycles. Using procurement data from the Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System (PhilGEPS) for 2021 to 2025, this paper examines contract values, procurement frequency, and non-competitive procurement activity across the pre-election, election, and non-election periods. Guided by the Political Budget Cycle framework and Rogoff’s signaling model, fixed-effects estimations test whether procurement implementation systematically differs across electoral windows. The results show that the implementation of procurement varies widely across Electoral Cycles. Contract values are higher in the pre-election periods, procurement frequency increases modestly, and other patterns consistent with procurement front-loading emerge. In contrast, election periods are characterized by low procurement frequency. Further analysis indicates that such patterns may be especially strong in procurement channels where non-competitive procurement is possible, consistent with changes in the timing and size of procurement activities, but also changes in the composition of contract allocation. Contract-level analysis thus provides complementary evidence at the implementation level to the political economy and public procurement literature, which mostly relies on traditional aggregate fiscal indicators, offering new insights into how electoral incentives may shape government contracting behavior.

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