Family network as informal contract enforcement mechanism
| dc.contributor.author | de Guzman, Reinier | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-11-14T07:33:09Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-11-14T07:33:09Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019-07 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates an informal contract enforcement mechanism that could induce positive-sum transactions between a firm and farmers. There is a hold-up problem of firms not engaging with smallholders given the risk of side-selling. I examine the experience of Lamac Multipurpose Cooperative in buying vegetable produce from smallholders and selling these to institutional markets. I model this as a repeated game between the cooperative and the individual farmer. The model predicts that a stronger family network reduce the optimal price that the cooperative would need to offer to a farmer in order to make it rational for her to honor the contract. Data on committed delivery, actual sales, and farmers’ network centrality measure are used to test this. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://selib.upd.edu.ph/etdir/handle/123456789/1341 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | Hold up problem | |
| dc.subject | Contract enforcement | |
| dc.subject | Family network | |
| dc.title | Family network as informal contract enforcement mechanism | |
| dc.type | Thesis |