Cooperative solution in a Hawk-Dove game
| dc.contributor.advisor | Balanquit, Romeo Matthew T. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Abesamis, Jerome T. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-11-14T06:04:28Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-11-14T06:04:28Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-01 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper reexamines the equilibrium solutions of the typical Hawk-Dove game that is commonly used in the analysis of conflict. Consistent with recent empirical studies, I show that the cooperative solution (Dove, Dove) can be reached by players interacting with a fixed number of neighbours in a space. This presents another way to avoid the idea of Nash equilibrium in the single one-period game. I introduce here a cooperation stability threshold a such that when reached, the cooperative equilibrium (Dove, Dove) is sustainable. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://selib.upd.edu.ph/etdir/handle/123456789/1276 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | Cooperative solution in a Hawk-Dove game | |
| dc.type | Thesis |