Asset-ownership and tenure in sugarcane production
| dc.contributor.advisor | Jurado, Gonzalo M. | |
| dc.contributor.author | De Dios, Loreli C. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-10-10T04:48:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-10-10T04:48:38Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1983 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The literature shows that contracts arise to bring together agents with different endowments of physical and human capital as well as risk-bearing capacities. The coexistence of different contracts is shown to depend on worker characteristics, i.e., differences in the choice of contracts in a risky environment reflect an underlying distribution of means of production, with the more endowed laborers choosing to be tenants and the less endowed ones hired as wage-workers. The screening model is adopted to show that information is transmitted via contractual choice. The hypothesis is confirmed using both logit and OLS procedures to test survey data. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://selib.upd.edu.ph/etdir/handle/123456789/685 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | Asset-ownership and tenure in sugarcane production | |
| dc.type | Thesis |