A mathematical theory of social institutions: with an illustration on the pure agricultural contracts
| dc.contributor.advisor | Montes, Manuel F. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Alba, Michael M. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-10-18T06:48:04Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-10-18T06:48:04Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1987-10 | |
| dc.description.abstract | A theory of social institutions is derived by depicting social problems that recur systematically as supergames. The equilibrating process -- institutionalization -- is modelled as an expanded Estes Learning Model in which the possible institutions are the absorbing states. When applied to agricultural production, the model, because of its feature of informational asymmetry between players, points to the risk attitudes of agents or owners of production factors as determining the type of institution that emerges. When players are risk neutral, all contracts (fixed wage, sharecropping, and fixed rent) have equal chances of becoming institutions. In a risk averse regime, however, sharecropping turns out to be the most probable institutional solution. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://selib.upd.edu.ph/etdir/handle/123456789/760 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | A mathematical theory of social institutions: with an illustration on the pure agricultural contracts | |
| dc.type | Thesis |