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    Political dynasties and economic development: evidence using nighttime light
    (2018-05-14) Garces, Ludigil L. ; Jandoc, Karl Robert L.
    Political dynasties in the Philippines is often associated with corruption, poverty, and abuse of power. This paper examines the effects of political dynasties in Philippine cities and municipalities. Due to lack of extensive poverty incidence measure in municipality level, we exploit the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program-Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) nighttime light data to estimate economic outcomes. The unique panel data is widely used as proxy for economic activity. We find that political dynasties do not necessarily affect the economic outcomes in Luzon and cities. However, these political families exacerbate poverty in places with weaker institutions like Mindanao.
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    Political dynasty in the local governments of Metro Manila
    (2013-10) Coronel, Lianca Patrice P.; Yambao, Jose III F.; Balanquit, Romeo Matthew T.
    This paper contributes to the existing literature of political dynasties by providing a quantifiable and comparative measure on the intensity of political dynasties within the local governments of the National Capital Region of the Philippines. Although there is currently an extensive literature on political dynasties in the Philippines, none have yet quantified the magnitude of political dynasties based on the scope and successions of power of dynasties at a geographical level. We created a Political Dynasty Index to measure the intensity of political dynasties per city through a set of multidimensional criteria: Type of succession, scope of current term, distance between terms, and degree of relation. Using the NCR local government elections results since 1988 from the Comelec on Elections, we identifY the political dynasties per city and score them according to the point system given by the index. We find that out of the 17 cities in NCR, Las Pinas scored the highest as the city with the highest intensity of political dynasties while Taguig scored the lowest as having the least intensity of political dynasties in its local government. In addition, a large weight of a city's score was greatly influenced by only one or two dominating political families in each city. These dynasties continue to grow as they maintain their hold on key positions in local government. Particularly, dominant political dynasties head both the executive and legislative branch of the city, which are ideally meant to check and balance one another. Moreover, officials elected into high positions in local government are found to start political dynasties while in power as they are succeeded by another family member before their term ends.
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    Political dynasty and its impact on regional growth and poverty
    (2012-04-02) David, Jana Azalea D.; Manalili, Hannah Lizette S.; Pernia, Ernesto M.
    The Philippine political arena is largely dominated by powerful political clans that are spread across the regions, each one controlling a certain local government unit or units, though the country is supposed to be a democracy. For regional development, local government units play a vital role, along with the interplay of national and local policies, projects and services, in fostering economic growth and poverty reduction. This paper finds that political dynasties and re-elected politicians adversely affect growth and poverty reduction in the areas they govern. Reforms are needed to improve governance and thereby boost economic growth and poverty reduction.
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    Political dynasty and local fiscal performance
    (2012-10) Mauricio, Michael S.; Villanueva, John Emmanuel B.; Pernia, Ernesto, M.
    Using panel data from the fiscal reports of municipalities in the province of Rizal, our paper examines the impact of political dynasties on local fiscal performance, as measured by the ability to generate local revenues, dependency on fiscal transfers, and per capita expenditure on social services. Our findings suggest that, compared with non-dynastic municipalities, dynastic municipalities have lower local revenue collection, higher dependency on the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), and higher spending per capita on social services. Moreover, the high social spending behavior of dynastic municipalities is seemingly facilitated by their high dependency on IRA These results seem consistent with the view regarding the predatory tendencies of political dynasties. The concentration of power within a single political family tends to breed a culture of rent-seeking behavior and lack of incentive to work for the long-term welfare of its constituency.