A politico - economic analysis of the voting behavior in the House of Representatives in the demand for land reform
| dc.contributor.author | Escresa, Laarni C. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-02-19T07:27:05Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-02-19T07:27:05Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1995-03 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper attempts to explain the political economy of land reform using the interest group theory. This study attempts to find the determinants of the level of land redistribution supplied by the members of the House of Representatives as reflected in the voting decisions in the process of adapting bills on land reform. Since land reform assumes the characteristic of a public good, its supply is a function of the intensity of the groups demanding and opposing it. The study shows that the probability of voting for the level of redistribution is related to the proportion of area planted to crops reflecting different degrees of lobbying power by the landowners and the amount of land owned by the incumbent. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://selib.upd.edu.ph/etdir/handle/123456789/4601 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | Politico-Economic Analysis | |
| dc.subject | Voting behavior | |
| dc.title | A politico - economic analysis of the voting behavior in the House of Representatives in the demand for land reform | |
| dc.type | Thesis |