Fare game: the contribution of collective bargaining to road passenger transport fare determination
| dc.contributor.author | Corpuz, Ma. Blesilda C. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sapina, Maria Leticia L. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-01-16T07:47:49Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-01-16T07:47:49Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006-03 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This study aims to discuss the possible effects of political pressures in the fare-setting process and draw implications for policy improvement. Working under the assumption that fare determination is a function of certain operating costs (diesel, price of spare parts) and the influence exerted on the regulatory agency (transport strikes), the authors used the fixed effects regression model to determine the contributions and the significance of each variable. Results from the multivariate analysis show that the price of diesel, exchange rate, the occurrence of strikes, participation of more than one transport group and the success of the strike have significant contributions to the process of setting fares. Also, the price of diesel, the occurrence of strikes and the success of the strike exhibit a positive relationship with the transport fare, while the exchange rate and the participation of more than one militant transport group are found to have a negative relationship with transport fare. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://selib.upd.edu.ph/etdir/handle/123456789/4077 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | Collective bargaining | |
| dc.subject | Fare | |
| dc.subject | Transportation industry | |
| dc.subject | Transportation | |
| dc.subject | Fare determination | |
| dc.subject | Public transporation | |
| dc.title | Fare game: the contribution of collective bargaining to road passenger transport fare determination | |
| dc.type | Thesis |